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ABSTRLACT 
Aut~omobile seat belts, child restraints, and motorcycle helmets have the 
demonstrated potential to prevent fatalities, reduce the severity of injuries, 
and reduce overall losses associated with traffic crashes. Modern 
restraints are inexpensive, widely available, and minimally inconvenient to 
the user, yet in spite of these attributes, most American travelers fail to 
take advantage of them. This is especially true with respect to seat belts 
and child restraints in passenger cars, where usage rates have consistently 
remained below 20 percent. 
Many nations have responded to the problem of nonuse of restraints by 
enacting laws requiring their use. Belt-use laws, which are common in 
Europe, Canada, and Australia, have not, so far, been politically feasible in 
the United States. Nevertheless, policymakers in both the public and 
private sectors have at their disposal a wide range of strategies other than 
comprelhensive, mandatory belt-use laws. Legislation requiring certain 
classes of operators or occupants, especially motorcyclists and small 
children, to use restraints, enjoys popular acceptability. Regulations 
requiring restraint use while performing governmental business, and similar 
on-the-job regulations in private industry, are increasingly common. 
Information and education programs, directed at the general public and at 
such intermediate audiences as employers, physicians, and schoolteachers, 
may increase restraint use over a long period of time. Economic 
incentives for individuals who use restraints, or for those who actively ' 
promote restraint use by others, may lead to increased usage. This paper 
presents some promising alternatives to mandatory belt-use legislation that 
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OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS AND 
TRAFFIC CRASH LOSS REDUCTION 
Since the automobile was introduced into American society, several 
strategies have been employed to reduce the number of traffic crashes and 
the magnitude of losses associated with them. Some of those strategies 
have been aimed at  eliminating factors-such as impairment by alcohol and 
other drugs-that increase the risk of a crash. Other strategies-such as 
improved road design and production of more ffcrashworthyv vehicles-seek 
to reduce the damage that occurs in a traffic crash, 
Two driver-oriented strategies have the demonstrated potential to 
reduce the losses associated with the crashes that inevitably will occur. 
The first of these is the lowering of speeds, for example, through the 
imposition and enforcement of the 55-mph national maximum speed limit. 
Slower speeds mean that there is less energy to be dissipated in a crash 
and absorbed by the crashed vehicle and its occupants; the result is a 
lessened chance of a fatal or other serious injury. The second strategy is 
the promotion of universal use of occupant restraints. By lloccupant 
restrain1tsf1 we mean lap and shoulder belts for adults and approved child 
restraint systems for small children traveling in automobiles, and crash 
helmets; for motorcycle riders. These devices redistribute and absorb 
energy in crashes that otherwise would be absorbed by the driver or 
passenger, and thus reduce the risk of death or serious injury. Unlike 
reduced speeds, however, a condition even approaching universal restraint 
use has yet to be achieved. Widespread nonuse of restraints in effect 
imposes needless taxes on citizens who must bear the added cost of social 
programs to compensate and rehabilitate crash victims and their 
dependents. Universal use of restraint systems that are widely available 
and miriimally inconvenient could cut the annual highway death toll by as 
much ELS one-fourth and reduce the social costs of traffic crashes by 
billions of dollars annually. 
So far, however, progress has not been made in inducing American 
travelers to use their restraints regularly. Noncoercive campaigns such as 
multimillion-dollar advertising l1carnpaignsl1 have largely failed to produce 
significant and lasting increases in restraint usage rates. Past experience 
with coercive measures suggests that there is strong public resistance to 
enforced self-protection. Conceding the poor prospects for enactment of 
mandatory restraint-use laws in the United States, policymakers and 
researchers have begun to explore alternative means of increasing restraint 
use. 
This paper describes the development of the principal occupant 
restraints as well as the legal climate in which each evolved; describes the 
scope of the social problem (or the wasted opportunity) represented by 
restraint nonuse; and presents suggested approaches for solving the 
problems of widespread nonuse and resistance to compulsory-use strategies. 
We admit at the outset that a solution to this problem cannot easily be 
found; however, we believe that a number of possible strategies exist that 
may have some impact on the level of casualties and financial losses 
associated with traffic crashes. 
OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The chief occupant restraint system in use in the United States and 
elsew here in the industrialized world is the lap-and-shoulder assembly in 
passenger automobiles. In the United States, nearly 100 percent of the 
nation's passenger car fleet is equipped with these restraints. In addition 
to passenger cars, upwards of five million motorcycles are registered 
nationwide, and more than 4,000 motorcycle-related deaths occur each 
year. Thus motorcycle helmets are of interest in  societyls efforts to 
reduce crash losses. Finally, some 15.6 million Americans are children 
under the age of five years (U.S. Department of Commerce 1980), and 
some one thousand young children are killed annually in traffic crashes, 
Because adult passenger restraints provide less than full protection for 
small children, the use of special child-restraint devices is also an essential 
part of a loss-reduction program involving occupant restraints. Where 
special devices are not available, children old enough to sit up by 
themse!lves are safer with a lap belt fastened snugly than unrestrained. 
Autorn~obile Seat Belts 
Air passengers have used seat belts for decades, but automobile seat 
belts have been introduced only recently. Prior to 1955, when Ford and 
Chryslczr introduced seat belts as optional equipment, such restraints were 
used only in automobile races. Public acceptance of the newly introduced 
seat bielts was minimal, and the number of vehicles equipped with belts 
remained small. 
Governmental involvement in the promotion of universal restraint use 
began with state legislation requiring the installation of seat belts or seat 
belt arlchorages on new vehicles. Wisconsin, in 1962, was the first state 
to passl a law requiring anchorages on new vehicles sold within that state; 
a number of other states shortly followed Wisconsin's lead. By 1966 
American automakers, cognizant of the legislative trend, began to install 
lap belts in all vehicles on a voluntary basis (Ames 1972). 
The federal government, through a regulation of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 
Number 208 in 1968. FMIISS 208, which became effective in April 1967, 
required lap belts at all seating positions and lapand-shoulder assemblies 
at  the two front outboard positions on newly manufactured vehicles. That 
standarld, which has remained in effect, has resulted in nearly all vehicles 
being equipped with belt systems. 
In 1977 NHTSA conceded that mandatory seat belt use legislation was 
unlikely and that voluntary measures were unlikely to increase low belt 
usage rates. As an alternative, NHTSA promulgated an amendment to 
FMVSS 208 that would require the installation of "passivetf or automatic 
restraints that the driver does not have to activate. Automatic restraints 
include air cushion restraints ("air basstt) and automatic seat belts. These 
devices are now offered by some manufacturers as optional equipment and 
a relatlively small number of vehicles are equipped with these devices. 
Currently, the automatic-restraint requirements are scheduled for phasing-in 
beginning with the 1983 model year for larger vehicles. That standard, 
however, is undergoing congressional and administrative review, and its 
future is considered uncertain. 
Motorcycle Helmets 
Protective helmets have a longer history than automobile seat belts. 
Protective helmets have been used at least since ancient Greece, and the 
ancestors of protective goggles date back as early as the fifteenth century 
(Ellis 1964). Armies have long used helmets in battle, and helmets were 
used in such sports as auto racing and football years before the motorcycle 
achieved its current popularity. As motorcycle registrations and fatalities 
increased, especially after 1960 (see Figure I), research into crash helmets 
and public pressure for laws requiring helmet use and eye protection for 
cyclists both increased. Unlike automobile seat belts, the use of which is 
generally not required in the United States, motorcycle helmet use is 
required in a considerable number of states. Research and development 
work on helmets continues, and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
Nunber 218 codifies the widely adopted Standard Z90.1 of the American 
Standards Testing Institute as the performance standard for helmets. 
Child Restraints 
Small children riding in automobiles present a special safety problem. 
They are especially likely in a crash or during sudden deceleration to 
become free-flying llmissilesll inside the vehicle, a circumstance that results 
in the child's head absorbing most of the impact energy. The added forces 
on the child's head increases the risk of his or her being killed or seriously 
injured (Dye 1962). Automobile belts, while they provide better protection 
than no restraints, are not completely satisfactory as child restraints: the 
child's pelvis is not sufficiently developed to absorb the forces of a lap 
belt; the child's body structure and center of gravity are such that he or 
she may fly loose from the lap belt; and the child's thorax is too flexible 
for the loads presented by adult shoulder harnesses (Roberts 1972). 
Car seats for children have existed for years. Research on child 
restraints was reported as early as 1959, when Moore and associates 
FIGURE 1 
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studied the crash experience of child passengers in a set of traffic crashes 
during 195 9. Dye (1962) reported an evaluation of then-existing restraints 
and set out criteria for evaluating future child restraints. Developmental 
work took place during the 19607s, and by 1970 both Ford and General 
Motors had developed, mass produced, and widely promoted their versions 
of child restraint devices. 0 ther manufacturers also marketed their 
products; however, many then-existing devices were shown to have design 
and performance deficiencies (Robbins, Henke, and Roberts  1970). 
Criticism of available restraints led to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration's (NHTSA) promulgating Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard Number 213 in 1971. There has been criticism that FMVSS 213 
has not been effective and that it has not kept substandard devices from 
appearing on the market; in response to the criticism, NHTSA amended the 
standard to require dynamic testing (crash testing involving dummies) of 
devices. Presently a wide variety of devices produced by automakers and 
other manufacturers are available, and a number of devices already on the 
market have been crash-tested (Physicians for Automotive Safety 1980). 
RESTRAINT USE IN THE UNITED STATES 
No nation has more registered motor vehicles than the United States, 
and no population logs more vehicle miles than the American motoring 
public. Thus, even though the crash and death rates per mile of travel 
are lower in the United States than anywhere else in the world, millions of 
crashes and injuries occur annually. While, on any given trip, the 
probability of being involved in a crash is extremely low, cur rent  
* 
population and crash data show that a typical American faces a one-in-six 
chance of being involved in a traffic crash, and almost a one-in-100 
chance of suffering a serious injury during a given year. In a typical 
lifespan of 75 years the average person is almost certain to be involved in 
a t  least one traffic crash, and can expect to experience about six crashes; 
and faces about a 50 percent probability of suffering a disabling injury and 
one chance in fifty of becoming a traffic fatality (National Safety Council 
1980; U.S. Department of Commerce 1980). On the basis of conditional 
hazard rates, motor vehicle travel is about as risky as skiing or hunting; 
that is, the probability of being killed on a one-day auto trip is about the 
same as the probability of suffering a fatal injury while on a one-day 
skiing or hunting trip. In fact, a one-day auto trip is only slightly less 
dangerous than one day spent on a military assignment during the Vietnam 
war (Starr 1969). 
Thuis a traffic crash, while unlikely on any particular trip, is a 
foreseeable event over the long run. It is therefore prudent to take 
reason(ab1e steps to reduce the consequences of crashes that are almost 
certain to occur. In spite of doubts expressed earl ier  about the  
effect i veness-and even the possible danger-of automobile seat belts and 
motorc:ycle helmets, scientific evidence has clearly established that these 
devices prevent far more losses than they cause (National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration 1973). 
Nevertheless usage rates for the most common occupant restraint 
system, automobile lap-and-shoulder belts, has been and remains low. A 
1979 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration survey found that 11 
percent of all drivers and even fewer passengers made regular use of the 
devices. This figure represented a decline from NHTSA1s estimate of the 
previous year's usage rate, 13 percent. The Opinion Research Corporation 
(1978) ifound that 1 4  percent of all drivers used their belts regularly, and 
45 to 50 percent of occupants used belts occasionally or under special 
driving conditions. One of the arguments raised by NHTSA in support of 
its automatic-restraint requirement is that belt  usage ra t e s  have 
consistently remained below 20 percent, a figure not inconsistent with the 
results of various restraint-use surveys reported by Grim m (1980). The 
portion of small children who are restrained is even smaller; observational 
studies reported by Grimm (1980) reported usage rates as low as two 
percent, A study conducted by Williams in 1974 and reported in 1976 is 
typical; in automobiles observed leaving amusem ent areas and shopping 
areas in three states, only seven percent of the children under age ten 
were restrained. Usage rates for motorcycle helmets are considerably 
higher than for adult or child restraint systems in automobiles. One major 
reason is that helmet use was required for a decade in almost all states, 
and their use is still required in nearly half the states. In states that 
have mandatory headgear laws, almost 100 percent of motorcycle riders 
and passengers wear helmets; in jurisdictions without helmet laws (at least 
for adult riders), helmet-use rates are on the order of 50 percent, a figure 
that is still considerably higher than for automobile restraints (Tsongos 
1980). 
Widespread nonuse of restraints is not exclusively an ~ m e r i c a n  
phenomenon. Ten years ago, the substantial majority of Canadian, 
Australian, and European motorists failed to use their belts-a phenomenon 
that has been lessened in many countries by legislation requiring the use of 
belts. The value of occupant restraints lies not in preventing traffic 
crashes but in minimizing their effects when they occur. Therefore, when 
a substantial part of the nation's motoring population fails to take 
advantage of available restraints, some of the deaths, casualties, and 
economic losses attributable to traffic crashes are unnecessarily incurred. 
Estimates of the number of preventable deaths and personal injuries are 
necessarily imprecise, since some degree of speculation is involved. 
Nevertheless, a good "ball parku estimate is provided by NHTSA: 12,000 
of the nearly 52,000 fatalities that occurred in 1979 could have been 
averted had all the victims been using seat belts at the time they crashed 
(Transportation Research Board 1980). Research studies examined by 
Jones, Franson, and Joscelyn (1980) indicate that nonfatal injuries could be 
reduced by 20  to  50 percent through universal restraint use. Economic 
losses attributable to the nonuse of restraints are even more difficult to 
estimate. Methods of scaling injuries and measuring the economic impacts 
of fatalities differ from study to study. Examining prior research into the 
economic costs of restraint nonuse (e.g., Ontario Ministry of Transportation 
and Communications 1977; Faigin 197 6), Jones, Franson, and Joscelyn (1 980) 
made a conservative estimate that the total costs of nonuse total $10 
billion annually, and may range as high as $15 billion. Much of this total 
represents loss of productivity resulting from the death or incapacitation of 
a working citizen. Other substantial costs include such costs as medical 
and holspital bills, professional fees, welfare payments, funeral expenses, 
and legal costs. It is difficult to determine who pays the $10-15 billion 
annual bill for preventable crash-relat ed costs. Not all "directll costs are 
necessarily borne by the victims and their families, while, on the other 
hand, not all lost productivity is spread across society as a whole. It is 
safe to assume, though, that much of the added cost of restraint nonuse is 
lfpassed ont1 to individual citizens in the form of higher taxes and insurance 
premiums and, even more indirectly, in the form of inflation and 
diminished purchasing power. 
In sum, available occupant restraints, if universally used, could bring 
about a large reduction in the total social costs attributable to traffic 
crashes;. However, despite their low cost and comparatively minimal 
inconvenience as well as their familiarity to the American traveling public, 
usage rates--especially for adult and child restraints in passenger cars- 
remain low. In many other nations government has responded to this 
problem of restraint nonuse by enacting laws requiring their use, and the 
data (e.g., Ziegler 1977) show that mandatory restraint-use laws are the 
most effective means of increasing usage rates. 
CURRENT STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING RESTRAINT USE 
Data1 gathered from other nations indicate that mandatory belt-use laws 
have brought about the most significant and lasting increases in belt usage 
rates. In this country, when state laws required the wearing of motorcycle 
helmets and eye protection, observed usage rates in those jurisdictions 
approached 100 percent (Tsongos 1980). Nevertheless, the idea of applying 
mandates to personal behavior is not popular in the United States; the 
experiences of the seatbelt-interlock and continuous buzzer devices in 1974 
and motorcycle helmet laws since 1976 are illustrative. Therefore, 
a l te rna t ive  points of influence on restraint-use behavior--including 
variations on comprehensive belt-use laws--much be considered and 
attempted. 
A clommittee of the Transportation Research Board (TRB) (1980) 
identified four categories of societal action aimed at changing individual 
at  ti tudes--and ultimately individual behavior-regarding the use of safety 
belts: prescription, that is, laws, regulations, and judicial decisions 
requiring restraint use or penalizing nonuse; economic incentives; 
changing perceptions about safe ty  belt use; and persona l  and 
community influence, especially involving health-care professionals. The 
TRB approach recognizes that societal mechanisms other than the formal 
structures of the legal system can be brought to bear on the risk of 
traffic crashes and traffic crash losses, and that decisions regarding safety 
can be influenced by means other than penalizing those who make unsafe 
decisions. A companion paper, Managing the Traffic Crash Risk (Joscelyn 
and Jones 198 I), discusses more fully the range of risk-management forces 
in existence in society and the range of strategies available for influencing 
individual choices. 
Prescription: Coercive Strategies to  Promote Restraint Use 
In the United States and other countries the earliest laws concerning 
occupant restraints required the installation of seat belts at the time of 
manufacture. Those regulations remain in existence and appear in Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard Number 208. Federal and state legislation 
has resulted in almost universal installation of lap-and-shoulder belt 
assemblies in passenger cars, but legislation does not deal with the use of 
available restraints. In the United States, belt usage rates have remained 
below 20 percent and there are indications (e.g., Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety 1980) that usage rates are declining. Surveys taken five 
to ten years ago in other countries found comparable results. Ziegler 
(1977) reported survey results showing usage rates of eight to 40 percent 
in  selected Western nations prior to the passage of mandatory belt-use 
laws. 
Mandatory Belt-Use Laws. In many other nations the response to low 
usage levels has been legislation requiring the use of restraints. Beginning 
in  the Australian state of Victoria in 1969, all or part of nearly thirty 
nations have mandated seat belt use. These laws typically provide for 
modest fines or civil penalties on nonusers. Enforcement is usually carried 
out as an adjunct to general law enforcement; for example, a driver 
stopped for speeding who is discovered not wearing a seat belt will be 
cited for that offense as well. Most seat belt legislation has been 
accornpanied by public information campaigns prior to their effective date 
to increase public awareness of and support for the law, and most 
jurisdictions continue to publicize their restraint-use legislation and 
enforcement of it. In many countries public acceptance was above the 
fifty percent level before laws were enacted. Table 1 compares the major 
features of selected nations1 seat belt use legislation. Mandatory belt-use 
laws have been proved effective. Usage rages after their passage ranged 
from 32 to 93 percent. Fatality reductions of ten to 46 percent, and 
injury reductions of 15  to 46 percent, have been reported in crash data 
supplj.ed by nations that have enacted seat-belt laws. Table 2, prepared by 
Ann Grimm of The University of Michigan, Highway Safety Research 
Institute, summarizes the effectiveness of belt-use laws in selected nations. 
In the United States no direct attempt comparable to congressional 55- 
mph speed limit legislation has been made to impose a mandatory seat belt 
use law. In 1972 NHTSA indirectly attempted to mandate belt use by 
requiring the installation of seat belt-interlock or continuous buzzer 
systerns in passenger cars, beginning with the 1974 model year. Interlock 
systerns prevent operation of the vehicle, and continuous buzzer systems 
produice a continuous warning signal, until the front seat occupants fasten 
their restraints. These systems proved politically unpopular and an act of 
Congress (Public Law 93-492) specifically forbade NHTSA to impose 
interlock and continuous-buzzer requirements. Consequently, only 1 9 7 4  
model year vehicles and some 1 9 7 5  vehicles were produced with such 
systerns. A t  about the same time (19731, Congress appropriated funds to 
support incentive grants to states that adopted mandatory belt-use laws. 
Only the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico responded by enacting such a law, 
and appropriations for the incentive program were discontinued the 
followling year (Wilson 1979). The most recent federal attempt to achieve 
universal occupant restraint use focuses on manufacturers of vehicles 
SOURCE: Ziegler  (1977). D a t a  p repa red  by Nat iona l  Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration 
TABLE 1 
SAFETY BELT USAGE LAWS AROUND THE WORLD 
Public 
Effective Date Penalty for Information 
Country of Law Noncompliance Enforcement Program 
Australia 1-1-72 Max 1 Yes 
(all States) $20 
Balgium 6-1-75 $1.50-$15 .OO 
Canada 
(Ontario) 1-1-76 $20-100 1 Yes 
Canada 
(Quebec) 8-15-76 $10-20 0-1 None 
Czechoslovakia 1-1-69 Max $10 * 
Finland 7-1-75 None 3 Yes 
France 7-1-73(1) $10-20 1 Yes 
Israel 7-1-75(3) Max $110 3 Yes 
Japan 12-1-71 None 0 None 
Luxembourg 6-1-75 $5-12.50 
Netherlands 6-1-75 20 c -$I20 
New Zealand 6-1-72 Max $200 1 
Norway 9-1-75 None 0 Yes 
Puerto Rico 1-1-74 $10 0-1 Yes 
Spain 10-3-74(2) $15 
Sweden 1-1-75 Max $100 1 Yes 
Usual $10 
Switzerland 1-1-76 $8 1-2  Yes 
USSR 1-1-76 $1.50 1 None 
0 - Essentially none (1) On roads outside city limits 
1 - When motorist stopped for 1-1-75 usage required on city. 
another purpose (2) Usage not required in cit ies 
2 - Str ict  (when observed not wearing (3) Urban roads exempt 
belt) 
3 - Only requested t o  lfbuckle up" by official 
NOTE: Blanks indicate no information available. 
i 
TABLE 2 
JURISDICTIONS WITH RESTRAINT USE LAWSIFATALITY E INJURY 
REDUCTIONS/USAGE RATES/CHILD RESTRAINT PROVISIONS 
(Current a s  of J u l y  1981) 
J u r i s d i c t i o n  
A u s t r a l i a  
V i c t o r i a  
B.S. Wales 
Queensland 
S. A u s t r a l i a  




Aus t r i a  
Belgium 
Bulgar ia  
Canada 
Brit. Co1umbj.a 









I r e l and  
I s r a e l  
!iew Zealand 
Yorwav 
7ue r to  Xico 





Date of Law Fat- - I n j u r y  Reduction 
1 /1 /72  5.7% (70-77) 
12/22/70 
8 /15/76 18% (75-77) 
7/1/77 23% (78) 
7/23/75 55% (78) 25% (78) 
1 /1 /76  30% (77) 
7 /1 /75  
7 /1 /73  ( r u r a l )  




7 /1 /75  11% (74-77) 
12 /1 /71  
6 /1 /75  
4/1/79 
h i l l 7 5  
6 /1 /72  27"driv. ) l 2L  ( d r i v e r s )  
9 /1 /75  
1 /1 /74  
12/77 
:sage ?.ate Chi ld  S e s t r a ~ n t  Law? 
85% ~e lbou rne -7178 -  
94% Sydney - 11/75 
84% under 8 - s p e c i a l  r e s t r a i n t  
82% over  8 - a d u l t  r e s t r a i n t s  
87% ? e r t h  - 517L 
69% Hobart  - 5/73 
83% 3/78 
50% hwys - l r ) / i 5  under 12 i n  r e a r  s eac  
76% r u r a l  - ' *5'7 under 12 exempt 
73% d r i v e r s  - 3 1 7 ~ 7  
81% 3/76 > under 5 exempt 
60% r u r a l  - 1980 
60% 3/78 r equ i r ed  6130180 
66% r u r a l  under 12 i n  r e a r  s e a t  
70% 1980 under 5 i n  r e a r  s e a t  
88% hwys - 12/75 under 15  exempt 
95% hwys - 1980 under 12  exempt 
under 12 - " s u i t a b l y  r e s t r a i n e d "  
7/76 
hwy dr iver- '79  
nnder 10 i n  r e a r  s e a t  
none 
hwys - 1980 under 6 i n  r e a r  s e a t ;  6-12 i n  
f r o n t  w i th  c h i l d  r e s t r a i n t  only  
1979 under 8 exempt 
hwys - 1980 under 15 sxempt 
1979 under 4 exempt 
none 
1980 f r o n t  only  i f  can u se  a d u l t  
b e l t  
hwys under 12  rn  r e a r  s e a t  
r u r a l  - 1'379 under 15  exempt 
hy r s  - 1970 under 12 i n  r e a r  s e a t  
SOURCE: Ann C .  Grimm, Librar ian,  Highway Safe ty  Research I n s t i t u t e ,  
The Universi ty  of Michigan 
REFERENCES: American Seat  Bel t  Council (1981); Johannessen and Pul ley 
(1977) ; Mackey (1981) , 
rather than their users. In 1977, NHTSA adopted an amendment to FMVSS 
208 that requires the installation of "passiver1 or automatic restraints on 
passenger vehicles. As of this writing, the passive-restraint standard is 
now scheduled to be phased in by the 1984 model year beginning with 
large 1983 model year vehicles. The new NHTSA administration took this 
step to delay for one year the first phase of the original schedule. 
Meanwhile, legislation that would prevent or further delay imposition of 
the automatic-restraint requirement is being considered in Congress. 
At the state level, no jurisdiction other than Puerto Rico has enacted a 
comprehensive seat belt use law. Wilson (1979) reports that between 1972 
and 1977, mandatory belt-use legislation was introduced in thirty-two 
states; however, only a handful of bills passed even one chamber of the 
legislature, and by 1977 interest in seat belt laws had diminished to the 
point that only six legislatures considered them. In 1 9 7 9  the National 
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances added a mandatory 
belt-use law to its model legislation, the Uniform Vehicle Code. The Code 
provision (reproduced in Figure 2) is not binding on any state but in the 
past the Code has been both persuasive and highly regarded in the traffic- 
law field. 
The "Seat-Belt Defensen. A legal approach that in effect penalizes 
those who fail to use available restraints exists in several states. The 
penalty is imposed on the crash victim who is injured as the result of 
another's careless operation of a vehicle and who sues the negligent 
operator to recover the damages that were suffered, It is applied as 
follows: the victim must bear the cost of any injuries that would have 
been avoided had he or she been using available seat belts at the time the 
crash occurred. This principle is sometimes called the "seat-belt defense." 
So far i t  has been rejected in the majority of courts that considered 
whether to adopt it (Donelson 1980). There are several legal and policy- 
based reasons why this is so. In essence, a negligent driver who raises the 
seat belt defense is arguing that the injured victim was either negligent or 
not acting with due care for his or her own well-being; or failed to take 
FIGURE 2 
UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE PROPOSED BELT-USE LEGISLATION 
Sec. 12-412-Lap and shoulder belts  required 
(a) Every passenger car manufactured or assembled after January 1, 
1965 shall be equipped with lap belt assemblies for use in the driver's and 
one other front seating position. 
(b) All motor vehicles made after January 1, 1968 shall be equipped 
with any lap or shoulder belt required at the time the vehicle was made 
by standards of the United States Department of Transportation; provided 
that nothing in this subsection shall affect the requirement in subsection 
(a) folr a lap belt in the driver's seating position. 
(c') The commissioner may except specified types of motor vehicles or 
seating positions within any motor vehicle from the requirements imposed 
by subsections (a) and (b) when compliance would be impractical. 
(dl No person shall install, distribute, have for sale, offer for sale or 
sell any belt for use in motor vehicles unless it meets current minimum 
standards and specifications (approved by the commissioner) (of the United 
States Department of Transportation). 
(e) Every owner shall maintain belts and assemblies required by this 
section in proper condition and in a manner that will enable occupants to 
use them. (SECTION REVISED, 1975.) 
Sec. 12-412.1-Driver must use lap belt  
(a) Every driver shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened lap belt. 
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to: 
(1) A driver in a seating position that is not equipped with a lap 
belt; 
(2) A driver frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering 
property from the vehicle so long as the speed of the vehicle between 
stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; 
(3) A driver possessing a written indication from a phvsician that he 
is una.ble for medical or physical reasons to wear a lap belt; or 
(4) A driver possessing a certificate or license endorsement issued by 
the department, or a similar agency in another state or country, indicating 
he is unable for medical, physical or other valid reasons to wear a lap 
belt. (NEW SECTION, 1979.) 
Sec. '12-412.2-Driver must use shoulder belt 
(a) Every driver shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened shoulder 
belt. 
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply: 
(1) To a driver in a seating position that is not equipped with a lap 
belt or a usable lap belt; 
(2)  To a driver in a seating position that is not equipped with a 
shoulder belt or with a usable shoulder belt; 
( 3 )  To a driver frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or 
delive15ng property from the vehicle so long as the speed of the vehicle 
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(4) To a driver possessing a written indication from a physician that  
he is unable for medical or physical reasons t o  wear  a l ap  be l t  o r  a 
shoulder belt; 
(5) A driver possessing a certificate or license endorsement issued by 
the department, or a similar agency in another s ta te  or country, indicating 
he is unable for medical, physical or other valid reasons to  wear a lap belt 
or shoulder belt; or 
(6) When use of the shoulder belt would interfere with operation of 
the vehicle. (NEW SECTION, 1979.) 
Sec. 12-412.3-Passengers must use lap and shoulder belts 
Every passenger other than the driver shall wear a properly ad jus ted  
and f a s t ened  l a p  bel t ,  or a properly adjusted and fastened lap belt and 
shoulder belt if his seating position is so equipped, unless such use is not 
possible, physical  o r  occupat iona l  reasons under rules adopted by the 
department. (NEW SECTION, 1979.) 
See. 12-412.4-Effect of nonuse in civil litigation 
Failure t o  use any belt in violat ion of th i s  Ac t  sha l l  no t  diminish 
recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of 
a motor vehicle. (NEW SECTION, 1979.) 
appropriate steps to mitigate (keep to a minimum) the damages resulting 
from the crash. The first argument-that an unbelted driver is negligent 
on account of not using restraints-is seriously undercut by the widespread 
nonuse of belts. If fewer than twenty percent of all occupants use seat 
belts, it  is difficult to argue that society considers the use of restraints an 
essential element of due care. The second argument-that failure to use 
seat belts is a failure to mitigate damages--is countered by a more 
technical argument: the opportunity to mitigate occurs after another's 
negligence occurs. With respect to restraints, since the decision whether 
to wear a belt occurs before the crash, most courts have concluded that 
wearing the belt is not a mitigation of damages (which is legally required) 
but instead constitutes anticipating the negligence of other drivers (which 
is not legally required). The logical basis of the courts1 reasoning with 
respect to the mitigation-of-damages argument is open to question. The 
court decisions are not only poor policy, but the courtst reliance on the 
anticipation-of-negligence theory in this class of cases has been criticized 
by the leading scholar in the area of tort law (Prosser 1972). Rejecting 
the traditional arguments against the seat-belt defense, courts in seven 
states--including California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania-have 
allowed for its use in cases where appropriate expert testimony establishes 
a clear connection between certain injuries and the nonuse of available 
restraints. There are some indications that other courts may relax their 
opposition to  the seat belt defense. In the past decade the rules for 
apportioning damages in negligence cases have shifted from an "all or 
nothingu approach (formerly, the injured party was either free of fault and 
collected the entire amount of damages, or was flcontributorily negligentf1 
and collected nothing) to a comparative approach that requires each party 
to bear that part of the loss that was attributable to his or her fault. 
The seat-belt defense is more consistent with the comparative-fault 
approach. More generally, doubts about the effectiveness of seat belts 
have been dispelled by statistical and other evidence (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration 1973) and their loss-reduction benefits are 
widely known. This is significant, because some of the early, widely 
followed court decisions that rejected the seat-belt defense expressed 
doubts about the effectiveness of belts. 
Selective Restraint-Use Legislation 
Comprehensive belt-use laws have not been enacted in the United 
States at either the federal or the state level, and the prospects for their 
passage in the near future are generally regarded as poor. However, 
occupant restraint legislation in the 'form of statutes and regulations 
directed a t  specific classes of vehicles or occupants does exist in many 
jurisdictions. The rationale for these selective prescriptions is similar to 
that for comprehensive restraint-use laws, except that the relative political 
power of the target group is small, or the target population is considered 
in need of greater protection than occupants in general. 
The most widely adopted selective laws apply to helmet usage by 
mot or cycle riders and passengers. Children, especially the youngest age 
groups, represent another class of occupants subject to  pro tec t ive  
legislation. Other target groups include commercial drivers and persons 
operating vehicles for business purposes. 
Motorcycle Helmet Laws. In the United States the first motorcycle 
helmet laws were enacted in 1966 in Massachusetts, Michigan, and New 
Y ork. The following year, the U.S. Department of Transportation included 
helmet-use legislation as one item that states were required to include in 
their highway safety programs as a condition of receiving federal highway- 
safety funds, Federal compulsion resulted in the enactment of helmet 
legislation in all but a few states. These laws were unpopular with a 
vocal minority of motorcyclists who challenged their constitutionality in 
the courts. A number of early decisions in the lower courts declared 
helmet laws unconstitutional because they found no public benefi t  
supporting the restriction on liberty that they imposed. However, later 
decisions almost uniformly upheld their constitutionality by finding a 
variety of social benefits to justify them-such as avoiding crashes in 
which a helmetless cyclist loses control of the vehicle; reducing welfare 
payments and costs of treating or rehabilitating injured cyclists; and 
maintaining a healthy and productive population (Ruschmann 1977). After 
failing in the courts, helmet-law opponents induced Congress in 1976 to 
remove the Department of Transportation's authority to penalize states 
that failed to enact helmet laws for cyclists aged 18 years and above. 
Within three years half the states either had no helmet law at all, or one 
that did not apply to adult riders and passengers. The trend toward repeal 
or weakening of helmet laws apparently has subsided, although helmet 
legislation remains a controversial topic in most legislatures (Ruschmann 
1980). Although there are comparatively few reported cases on the 
subject:, the "motorcycle helmet defense1' has been considered by some 
courts, In general, courts are more likely to entertain this defense when 
an injuired cyclist rides without headgear in violation of the state's helmet 
law, although a few states have language in their helmet laws that 
specifically prohibits courts from considering the issue of helmet nonuse in 
negligence suits. 
Chilid Restraint Laws. Tennessee, in 1978, became the first American 
jurisdiction to enact child-restraint legislation. Rhode Island enacted such 
a law in 1980, and at least ten other states followed in 1981. Similar 
legislation was considered or is pending in over thirty other states 
(Transport ation Research Board 1980). The Tennessee law, as originally 
enacted, applied to children aged four and under; these children must be 
properly secured in an appropriate child-protection device or held in the 
lap of an adult. Holding a child in another's lap is not effective in 
preventing injuries, and that provision has since been deleted from the 
Tennessee law, Other legislation-current and proposed-varies slightly with 
respect to the age and size of the children they cover, and whether an 
adult's lap is a legally acceptable substitute for a child restraint device. 
The Tennessee and Rhode Island laws, and most proposed statutes, impose 
a modest penalty on operators who violate them; frequently the penalty is 
refundable if  the operator can prove he or she has acquired a child 
restraint. A model state child-restraint law is reproduced in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 
PROPOSED MODEL LAW FOR MANDATED CHILD 
PASSENGER PROTECTION 
A. Model Law 
SECTION 1. Every driver transporting a child under the 
age of five (5) years in a motor vehicle registered in this state 
and operated on the roadways, streets or highways of this state, 
shall provide for the protection of the child by properly using a 
child passenger restraining system meeting applicalbe federal 
motor vehicle safety standards. provided that in no event shall 
failure to wear a child passenger restraing system be considered 
as contributory negligence, nor shall such failure to wear said 
child passenger restraint system be admissible as evidence in the 
trial of any civil action. 
SECTION 2. A person found to be in violation of Section 1 
shall be subject to a civil fine not to exceed $25. 
SECTION 3 ,  The bill will take effect 180 days after 
enactment. 
SOURCE: Michigan Office of Highway Safety Planning (1980) 
Oth~er Specialized Restraint-Use Legislation. A variety of statutes 
and administrative regulations require other specific subpo~ulations to use 
occupa~nt restraints. Regulations of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety 
requires operators of heavy trucks and intercity buses to wear belts. 
Drivers of school buses are required in at least four states to use their 
belts, isnd one state, Maine, requires belt use by school bus passengers 
when lbelts are available. California law requires occupants of driver- 
training vehicles to wear their restraints (Transportation Research Board 
1980). Some federal agencies and a number of states have enacted 
regulations requiring belt use while operating government-owned vehicles or 
while traveling on official business. A few states, such as Michigan, 
mandate child restraint use through regulations that apply to child-care 
providers such as day care centers (Treat and Ruschmann 1980). More 
generally, many industrial corporations, utilities, and units of local 
government (for example, police departments) have adopted mandatory 
belt-use policies for their employees. 
The current status of mandatory occupant protection measures is that 
comprehensive legislation or regulation requiring all occupants to be 
properly restrained is unlikely in the near future and that the prospects for 
acceptance of the Ifseat-belt defense" in the courts remain uncertain. On 
the other hand, legislation requiring the protection of specific populations- 
chiefly motorcylists, small children, and persons using vehicles as part of 
their official business-has achieved some degree of public acceptance in 
the United States. 
Nonprescriptive Strategies 
The three other strategies identified by the TRB panel do not involve 
legislation that requires occupants to use restraints, It is conceivable, 
though, that some activity in these areas may lead to compelled restraint 
use in at least some settings. Although the categories cited by the TRB 
panel are somewhat arbitrary, three major classes of nonprescriptive 
strategies-economic incentives, information and education, and personal 
and community influence-are included. 
Economic Incentives. Economic incentive approaches are llpositivell in 
nature. They are based on increasing the utility of a decision to act 
safely-in effect, rewarding those who choose safety. These approaches 
are the counterpart of prescriptive measures that are "negativeu and that 
impose additional disutilities on those who decide to follow an unsafe 
course of conduct. Positive strategies are not widely used, primarily 
because society relies so heavily on punishment, especially legal sanctions, 
to control traffic crash losses and other social risks. The TRB panel 
described two forms of economic incentives. Direct incentives focus on 
influencing an individual's decision whether to use occupant restraints. 
These include reductions of insurance premiums and tax incentives. (They 
are not, however, very widely used.) Indirect incentives are directed at 
persons who are in a position to influence others1 decisions about the use 
of restraints. One indirect strategy used today is developing data about 
the economic costs of traffic crashes and disseminating it  to employers 
with the intent that it will spur employers to adopt mandatory belt-use 
policies and other programs to increase employees1 restraint usage. State 
governments are also the targets of economic incentive programs. During 
fiscal 1979 Congress mandated that two percent of state highway-safety 
funds be directed to belt-usage programs. This raised $3.5 million for 
stat e-level programs. 
Information and Education. Persistently low belt usage rates in the 
United States have frustrated public and private safety organizations, and 
attempts have been made to discover why people do not use available 
restraints. In a NHTSA survey of public attitudes toward safety belts, two 
major reasons cited for nonuse are the discomfort and inconvenience 
associated with wearing restraints (Transportation Research Board 1980). 
Implicit i n  this finding is that most occupants do not consider the 
consequences of a traffic crash serious enough, or the probability of a 
crash great enough, to outweigh the inconvenience and discomfort of belt 
use. A perception so widely held suggests that societal action is needed 
to change the respective perceived costs of belt nonuse and crash 
involvement. To date, millions of dollars have been spent on mass media 
public service announcements, safety literature, and demonstrations such as 
the "Seat Belt Convincerf1 to induce greater use of restraints. Most of 
these efforts appear to have been unsuccessful. For example a costly 
mass media campaign with an emotional approach and the theme 
'Bomebody Needs Youff was conducted in Michigan; however, observational 
studies showed that only a modest increase in restraint use followed the 
campaign (Motorists Information, Inc. 1978). 
Penjronal. and Community Influence. In the highway safety process, 
both faamal and informal entities act to control traffic crashes and their 
losses. Informal risk-management systems include professional and social 
groups, family structures, customs, and traditions. Some information and 
education programs attempt to enlist specialized audiences--such as 
physicia-ns and schoolteachers-who are credible and who are in a position 
to impart traffic safety information to vehicle occupants. While it is 
difficult: to measure the influence of informal risk-management forces, the 
contribution of another's personal influence to a decision whether to use 
restraints cannot be overlooked. 
This is the dilemma facing those in traffic safety in the United States: 
the only strategy that has proven value in increasing seat belt usage is 
legislation requiring occupants to use them; however, comprehensive belt- 
use legislation is not considered politically feasible. Narrower coercive 
strategies, and a range of noncoercive strategies involving incentives, 
information and education, and social influence, are available and should be 
examined. 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PROMOTING RESTRAINT USE 
It has been established that regular use of occupant restraints by the 
American motoring population could substantially reduce traffic-related 
casualties and the losses associated with crashes, However, with the 
exception of motorcycle headgear, existing occupant restraints are used 
regularly by only a small minority of the American traveling public. 
People, however, are aware of the value of occupant protection; nearly 
half of all occupants make a t  least occasional use of s e a t  bel ts  
(Transportation Research Board 1980; Opinion Research Corporation 1978). 
Since the introduction of seat belts, attempts have been made by 
governmental and private entities to induce higher restraint usage rates. 
Strategies that do not involve compulsion have apparently not succeeded; 
compulsive strategies have proved unacceptable to the public. The lack of 
success to date should not lead to abandonment of all efforts to encouraga 
greater use of restraints; voluntary approaches may have a long-run, 
cumulative effect on restraint use, and might be important components of 
a series of strategies that might successfully increase usage rates 
(Transportation Research Board 1980). 
Overcoming the public's apparent apathy or even antipathy toward 
occupant restraints will require a combination of strategies applied in a 
coordinated fashion over a considerable period of time. A special 
committee convened by the Transportation Research Board developed a set 
of six recommended strategies to increase belt usage rates without 
resorting to comprehensive mandatory belt-use legislation. These 
recommendations, which are reproduced in Appendix A and summarized in 
Figure 4, provide the starting point for recommended future s tate  and 
local government policy. 
Selective Restraint-Use Legislation 
The f i r s t  two recommendations of the TRB committee call for 
mandatory restraint-use legislation on a less than comprehensive basis. 
They ref lect  the committee's realization that while European-style 
legislation has been politically infeasible in the United States, the public is 
more receptive to legislation directed a t  specific subgroups. Small 
children, especially, have historically been the target of special protective 
measures, such as child-labor and vaccination laws. The "freedom of 
choicen argument often raised in opposition to comprehensive belt-use laws 
FIGURE 4 
STRATEGIES RECOMMENDED BY THE TRANSPORTATION 
RESEARCH BOARD FOR INCREASING SEAT BELT USAGE 
State legislation requiring minors under age 18  to use 
rlestraints 
Federal regulations requiring restraint use when operating 
vehicles on official business 
More detailed federal guidelines governing the use of 
federal set-aside funds for state safety belt programs 
Identify and publicize the economic costs of nonuse of 
safety belts 
Encourage employers to adopt mandatory belt-use policies 
Treat traffic crashes and crash losses as a major public 
health problem, and promote greater involvement of health-care 
personnel in traffic safety efforts. 
has little force when applied to persons too young to understand, let alone 
make an intelligent decision about, risks. On the other hand, adolescents 
have been given some degree of legal autonomy about accepting certain 
risks, depending on the person's age and the risk involved. Some persons 
under age 18 may, for example, consent to medical treatment, have sexual 
intercourse, leave school, and-in most states--drive. Thus the I1youth- 
protectionv laws advocated by the TRB panel may encounter greater 
political resistance than laws to protect only infants and small children. A 
possible approach may be to require belt use by drivers under age 18 who 
hold restricted licenses or learners1 permits. Such an approach might not 
encounter as much political resistance and would not impose upon parents 
the burden of ensuring that their older children are restrained. 
Another approach is to focus on those whose calling is transporting 
children or caring for them. Many children and adolescents  a re  
transported in vehicles owned by schools, child-care centers, and camps. 
While only some large school buses are equipped with seat belts (Federal 
regulations do not require their installation, and there is no conclusive 
proof that belts are effective on those vehicles),, most smaller buses, vans, 
and passenger cars are so equipped. A promising avenue for achieving 
greater restraint use among minors would be legislation, similar to 
Michigan's regulations governing child-care facilities, calling for the driver 
and all occupants to  use available bel ts  in vehicles operated by 
transporters of minors (Treat and Ruschmann 1980). At least nine states 
have legal requirements for the use of appropriate restraints by day care 
providers (Lawrence Johnson and Associates 1978). 
The TRB committee did not consider restraints other than automobile 
passenger restraints and thus did not discuss motorcycle helmet laws. 
Since 1976, when Congress returned the issue of helmet legislation to the 
states, more than half the states have repealed or weakened their laws. 
Arguments based on free choice and individual liberty, combined with 
possible resentment of federal compulsion, proved more forceful than 
arguments stressing loss reduction and cost savings. Nevertheless, public 
support for helmet legislation is strong, and the legislative trend toward 
repealing or weakening these laws appears to have subsided. Interestingly, 
the sarne reasons the public cites for supporting helmet legislation apply to 
other forms of occupant-restraint legislation. This suggests that members 
of the driving public may favor occupant restraint legislation directed at 
others but not at themselves. 
The committee did not discuss the "seat belt defense" in civil cases 
involvirig automobile negligence. Adoption of this defense in the courts 
would reduce the losses of large fleet owners whose vehicles are frequently 
involve(d in traffic crashes, and road authorities who are increasingly sued 
by injured travelers alleging that defective roads caused their injuries. It 
would also indicate to the public that restraint usage is considered an 
integral. part of prudent conduct on the highway. Because of the weight 
of precedent rejecting the seat belt defense in courts, legislation may be 
necessary in many states to authorize its use. The prospects for such 
legislatiion are uncertain: a t  present five states have statutes that 
expresslly prohibit courts from considering the seat belt defense (Donelson 
1980), and legislators might consider a seat belt defense statute an 
impositi.on on the authority of the courts or a approach that 
artifically creates a legal duty to use seat belts. 
None of the selective approaches will bring about universal belt use; in 
fact, a combination of these approaches may produce only a modest 
increase. Nonetheless, an increase in usage is likely to occur. This, in 
turn, will increase the number of occasions where a belt user can influence 
another person, such as a spouse or child, or another member of a carpool, 
to use restraints as well. 
Adults who are hostile to seat-belt legislation may be more receptive 
to safety regulations imposed in the workplace--for example, policies 
requiririg the use of hard hats, goggles, or safety shoes. Thus the 
potential exists for promoting belt use by those who operate vehicles while 
on businless through the enactment of employee belt-use policies. 
The TRB committee reported that at least 19 states as well as several 
agencies; of the federal government have enacted some form of mandatory 
belt-use policy for employees traveling on official business, using 
government-owned vehicles, or using personal transportation for work- 
related travel. The panel also mentioned that several large industrial 
firms and public utilities, especially those that have thousands of vehicles 
in use, have adopted belt-use policies. 
These policies are admittedly difficult to enforce. Still, conducting 
%pot checksn of vehicles entering or leaving company premises, and relying 
on police reports of traffic crashes, may provide enough enforcement to 
"remind" drivers of the applicable work rules and thus bring about a 
significant increase in restraint usage. Some "naturally law-abiding" drivers 
will obey the belt-use rules regardless of how unlikely it is that they will 
be caught and disciplined. The experience of other nations in enforcing 
their comprehensive belt-use laws is relevant: while only a modest number 
of citations are written, this gives the law enough credibility to induce 
high levels of compliance. 
Some resistance to on-the-job belt-use policies may occur, but this is 
not an insurmountable obstacle. When hard-hat requirements were first 
imposed a t  construction sites there was employee hostility toward this 
policy. Today, the use of hard hats is universal and in fact has become 
the symbol of the construction trade (Wilson 1979). Belt-use rules can be 
vsoldv to employees rather than imposed by fiat. To induce employee 
acceptance, restraint-use rules could be inserted into collective bargaining 
agreements in exchange for expanded health-care benefits for employees, 
and the link between increased belt usage and a decrease in health 
insurance and workersf compensation premiums could be explained during 
contract negotiations. 
Restraint use could be required on military installations and other 
government-owned property, such as national or state parks. Restraint-use 
provisions also could be inserted in government contracts and could apply 
to all vehicles operated in connection with publicly funded programs. 
Again, enforcement may be difficult but a large number of naturally law- 
abiding occupants are likely to comply with such a policy without regard 
to the level of enforcement, Although occupant restraint regulations 
covering these areas would require government action, that action could be 
carried out through administrative bodies less subject to political pressures 
against be1 t-use requirements. 
Because government is a major employer, these is some overlap 
between occupant restraint legislation and employee belt-use policies. 
Likewise, because employers must be given persuasive reasons to adopt and 
enforce restraint-use policies for their work force, this strategy overlaps 
public information and education efforts designed to increase restraint use. 
Information and Education 
In lthe past most efforts to educate the public about the benefits of 
occupar~t restraint use have been media flcampaigns,n often using an 
emotional theme or a creative slogan or symbol, Usage rates over the 
years appear to indicate that these mass-media efforts have largely failed. 
While this may be true, one should not dismiss the possibility that media 
efforts have a long-term effect on behavior. Smoking is closely analogous 
to nonuse of seat belts: both are prevalent in society, both produce 
adverse consequences, and the adverse consequences are not i m mediately 
experienced. In the last twenty years an intense antismoking campaign has 
been wraged through the media by the government and by private health 
groups. Smoking, especially among young adults, has declined, and in some 
jurisdictions, public hostility to smoking has taken the form of legislation 
restricting smoking in public places. It is possible that a similar, long- 
term change in behavior may occur in other areas of public health and 
safety, including restraint use. 
The TRB committee recommended targeting employers and health-care . 
practitioners for education and information efforts. Employers who learn 
how mulch traffic casualties cost them, and physicians who are made aware 
that traffic crashes are one of the nationfs leading public health problems 
(see Hartunian, Smart, and Thompson 1980), may in turn attempt to induce 
greater use of occupant restraints by employees and patients, respectively. 
With respect to employers, the goal is some form of restraint-use policy 
applicablle to employees. In the case of health-care practitioners, such a 
response is not possible; there are no legal or employment-related sanctions 
for those who fail to follow "doctorts orders." However, physicians- 
especially pediatricians, family practitioners, and those associated with 
prevention-oriented programs such as health maintenance organizations- 
have the opportunity to influence their patients1 attitudes toward restraint 
use and towards traffic safety in general. Schoolteachers can exert a like 
influence on students in health education classes and esoecially on novice 
drivers enrolled in driver-education programs. Other individuals who are 
both credible and in a position to influence choices regarding the use of 
occupant restraints, such as automobile dealers and members of social or 
fraternal organizations, could be targets of public information and 
education efforts. 
The TRB committee alluded to other situations, such as stopping at a 
toll booth or for periodic vehicle inspections, as opportunities for  
government or private safety organizations to inject a message about the 
value of occupant restraints. Even in the absence of a restraint-use law, 
the public can be given the impression that restraint usage is a matter of 
interest to law-enforcement authorities (Transportation Research Board 
1980). These efforts can be reinforced by including belt use information in 
accounts of fatal and serious traffic crashes. The Ann Arbor (Michigan) 
News - regularly reports whether fatally injured crash victims had been 
wearing their seat belts (cooperation of police authorities was obtained and 
is necessary), and traffic crash reports by automobile clubs and safety 
organizations could emphasize how many traffic deaths that could have 
been averted through the use of restraints. 
While the current political climate is one of host i l i ty  toward 
government in general and regulation in particular, it is also one of thrift 
and economy-consciousness. Thus the public, as well as legislators, 
administrators, and employers, may be receptive to a restraint-use 
campaign stressing the unnecessary cost of nonuse-estimated to be $50 to 
$100 per year per motorist (based on Jones, Franson, and Joscelyn 1980). 
A similar approach could portray nonuse of belts by employees as a 
needless item of overhead that industry now bears. 
One approach mentioned by the TRB panel focuses on the tlrnessagesw 
given {audiences by television and motion pictures. A voluntary effort on 
the part of filmmakers and broadcasters to portray safer transportation 
behaviors may help eliminate the impression that traffic crashes are 
humoro~us events and that crashed occupants are seldom injured, Such 
efforts may induce so-called 'Iscript followersv to imitate the restraint-use 
habits of their favorite entertainers. 
Incentives 
In our companion paper, Managing the Traffic Crash Risk, we pointed 
out that society relies heavily on negative strategies, especially imposing 
legal srinctions on unsafe drivers, to control the traffic crash risk, and that 
alternative strategies--including the use of incentives--ought to  be 
considered. The TRB panel concluded that incentive programs would be 
too difficult to implement and might not induce significant behavioral 
changes,; that compliance with the terms of incentive programs would be 
too diffcult to monitor; and that the benefits of restraint use are too 
small and too indirect to support financial incentives. Even though using 
belts "is its own reward," several approaches tied to rewarding those who 
use restraints or who promote restraint use are feasible. 
One strategy identified by the panel was to impose smaller fines or 
fewer violation points against drivers who were using belts at the time 
they colmmitted a traffic offense. Although it is possible that a driver 
could fasten the restraint after being stopped but before being seen by the 
officer, this may not happen as frequently as is feared. In jurisdictions 
such as Ontario, where enforcement of belt-use laws commonly occurs in 
connection with police stops for violations, police apparently are able to 
detect many instances in which the driver buckles up after the fact 
(Wilson 1979). A variation of the "mitigating circurn~tances~~ approach is 
for a court or licensing authority to agree to reduce a driver's punishment 
in exchange for a promise to use belts regularly for a specified period of 
time. Violation of the agreement could be grounds for imposition of a 
license suspension or some other penalty otherwise authorized by law. 
A surer way of ensuring belt use is to reintroduce the seatbelt-interlock 
or continuous-buzzer system, but this time on an optional basis. Owners 
who have such a system installed on their vehicles could be eligible for 
reduced insurance rates or perhaps reduced licensing and registration fees. 
Car rental companies, corporate fleet owners, and owners with dependent 
children could thus increase restraint usage in their vehicles without 
spending a great deal of time and effort enforcing belt-use policies. 
A prior study indicates that the public perceives current restraint 
systems as inconvenient and uncomfortable. Both mechanical modification 
of belts, and information and education programs on how to adjust and 
wear belts and reminding drivers that restraint use is much more 
com f ort able than the consequences of an unrestrained crash, could bring 
about greater public receptivity to available restraints. 
Employers and other fleet owners also could be given incentives tied to 
their adoption of belt-use policies. Tax credits for the purchase of 
interlock systems, reduction in workerst compensation premiums, or reduced 
health insurance premiums, combined with an education effort pointing out 
the costs of traffic crashes to a particular firm, could be used to promote 
private industry belt-use policies. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
Policymakers in state and local government, and in the private sector, 
can take immediate action that is politically and administratively feasible 
to increase restraint use. Available strategies range from the traditional 
legal approach of prescribing a standard of behavior and punishing those 
who violate i t ,  to  innovative strategies such as financial rewards and 
informal means of influencing behavior such as using peer influence. 
Promising strategies found in or suggested by the highway safety literature 
include the following: 
a Enact selective restraint-use statutes that are as broad as 
politically feasible. Public antipathy to mandatory universal 
restraint use does not preclude narrower prescriptive strategies. 
Two specific and familiar legislative proposals in this area are 
motorcycle helmet-use and child restraint laws. If your state's 
legislature is considering such laws, the cost savings as well as the 
ireduction in casualties associated with them should be stressed. 
'Those who oppose such laws as infringements on liberty should be 
persuaded that the infringement is relatively small. To minimize 
resentment toward these laws, violations should be made noncriminal 
infractions punishable by modest civil penalties. 
4 Use administrat ive regulations,  work rules, and contract 
provisions t o  increase  r e s t r a in t  use in government-related 
Itravel. Res traint-use laws, com prehensive or selective, require 
legislative action to empower government. On the other hand, some 
administrative agencies may already have power to require restraint 
use in certain situations. Agencies could, for example, require those 
who apply for public funds to adopt restraint-use policies as a 
condition of receiving them; mandate restraint use by governmental 
employees traveling on official business as part of the applicable 
work rules; and require restraint use on military bases, parklands, 
and other government property. 
o Encourage pr iva te  employers to  prescribe restraint use as 
part of the i r  work rules  fo r  employees, A portion of the 
n1ationfs traffic crashes losses involves business travelers such as 
utility company employees and members of corporate sales forces. 
Crash losses incurred by these individuals also generate costs, 
especially insurance costs, for their employers. Thus an employee 
belt-use policy is analogous to other on-the-job health and safety 
rules with which employee compliance is likely to occur. One major 
reason for employerfs reluctance to impose belt-use requirements is 
that they are unaware of how much traffic crashes cost them, and 
how much of those costs could be avoided by universal restraint use. 
A,vailable data relating to crash losses should be disseminated, and 
efforts to develop more specific and usable data should continue. 
e Se lec t  spec i f ic  t a r g e t s  f o r  information and  e d u c a t i o n  
programs t h a t  maximize the potential for personal influence. 
Traditional mass media ucarnpaignsfl are too costly for units of state 
or local government to conduct. Instead, existing mass media 
efforts should be supplemented by specialized information and 
education programs designed to enlist the support of physicians, 
schoolteachers, and employers-people who deal with drivers on a 
personal basis and who are influential enough to persuade them to 
use restraint systems. Appeals to all groups should be accompanied 
by data showing the costs-social and economic-of traffic crashes 
involving unrestrained occupants. 
Enl is t  t h e  aid of t h e  news media and the entertainment 
industry in encouraging occupant restraint use. The mass media 
play a subtle but nonetheless real part in shaping public perceptions 
toward occupant restraints in particular and traffic safety in 
general. Today many people perceive traffic crashes as extremely 
unlikely events  and view res t r a in t s  as  inconvenient  and 
uncomfortable. News accounts of crashes that stress the link 
between restraint use and loss reduction, television programming that 
depicts traffic crashes as costly rather than humorous events, and 
motion picture scripts that call for respected performers to use 
belts on the screen, help create a public frame of mind that is 
more receptive to belt use. 
9 Consider the feasibility of using incentives to reward those 
who make use of occupant restraints and who promote the use 
of restraints. Directly rewarding individuals and businesses makes 
the point more clear that restraint use lessens crash losses. This 
strategy also may be more attractive than traditional negative 
strategies for encouraging safe behavior. At the individual level, 
possible incentives include reductions in fines and violation points for 
minor violators who were using restraints; tax credits; reducing 
insurance rates; and reducing license or registration fees. At the 
corporate level, tax credits and reductions in unemployment or 
workers1 compensation premiums a r e  possible categories of 
incentives. One frequently voiced objection to incentive programs is 
that compliance cannot be monitored, and that dishonest motorists 
would col lect  incentives and still refuse to wear restraints. 
Interlock systems, similar to those used in 1974,  are a possible 
:solution that is inexpensive and technically feasible. This approach 
tippears especially promising for monitoring employee compliance 
with on-the-job restraint-use policies. 
In c~onclusion, a combination of coordinated strategies should be applied 
over a long period of time. Those that we have identified are 
representative of the range of available and feasible strategies, and other 
strategies may successfully be pursued in your state or locality, No single 
strategy will be as effective in promoting res t ra in t  usage as a 
comprehensive mandatory belt-use law; in fact, it is conceivable that even 
a combination of strategies will not produce usage rates as high as those 
found in Europe, Canada, or Australia. But because of the prevailing 
po1itica.l and social climate in the United States, alternatives to mandatory 
belt-use laws represent a feasible immediate approach that society can 
take. We believe that the alternatives described here can produce 
significant increases in restraint usage and can lead to substantial 
decreases in crash losses. They are also likely to lead to greater public 
acceptance of the value of restraint use and may assist in creating the 
necessary climate for broader legislative iniatives. 
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